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The Elite and the Marginalised: An Analysis of Public Spending 







1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Paper is based on a political economy theme, where we explore, for the Indian states 
whether and how far the interests of the marginalised poor are undermined - particularly 
with respect to the provision of mass education – by the dominant elite consisting mainly 
of the landed and the capitalists. 
It is unfortunate that despite more than four decades of planning efforts with an 
emphasis on balanced regional development, inter- and intra-state disparities in literacy 
rates in India are striking. While adult literacy rate in Kerala was about 91%, it was about 
half of that level (47%) in Bihar in 2001. Gender inequity continues to remain a serious 
problem in all the states, though it is far worse in the worse-performing ones; the gender 
gap is only about 7% in Kerala while it is more than four times (30%) in Rajasthan and 
Bihar. The situation is even worse among the backward castes; their literacy rate was 
only 37.41% in 1991 compared to 52.21% for India as a whole; it was even lower among 
women belonging to the backward castes (23.76% as compared to 39.29% for all Indian 
women).  
While females constitute about 48% of the Indian population of more than a 
billion in 2001, about 24% belongs to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes category. 
The question however remains as to why the marginalised groups of women and low-
caste people in the Indian states may not obtain the full attention of the politicians in a 
democracy even when they have the numerical strength. When a country like Cameroon 
could more than double its rate of adult literacy in three decades after 1970 (from 30% to 
71%), the question remains as to why a flourishing democracy like India that started in 
the 1970s with 33% adult literates would still struggle with a rate of 57% in 2000.   
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Differences in the nature of politicians elected are a possible mechanism through 
which social/demographic structure could influence the allocation of public spending on 
education and thereby literacy among different sections of the population in the Indian 
states. This is because it is harder for a democratically elected government to be 
unresponsive to the needs of their electorate, especially when the latter is well informed 
and politically aware. In this respect, the paper explores the possible role of elite 
dominance and in doing so integrates the new institutional economics literature on 
persistence of under-development and also that on the political economy of the public 
goods provision in India. 
The recent institutional economics literature suggests that poorer countries lack 
the institutions needed or have the wrong institutions for economic growth (e.g., see   
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Rajan and Zingales, 2005, among others). 
More specifically, dominance by an elite that does not support human capital investment 
in the masses is a theme in several papers (e.g., Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000). The 
oligarchy will oppose widespread education because educated people are more likely to 
demand political power, thus undermining the dominance of the elite. The result could be 
lower public spending on mass education and hence persistence of illiteracy. Spread of 
mass education in contrast would increase the ability of the illiterate to take advantage of 
the social opportunity (and gain from pro-market reforms), which in turn may facilitate 
them making informed choices in the political process as well as to oust the elite from 
power (with their numerical strength). In this respect a distinction between the landed and 
capitalist elite could be quite important. As Galor and Moav (2006) argued, the 
productive co-operation between capitalists and workers was instrumental in the 
provision of public education for the masses. Since firms have limited incentive to invest 
in the general human capital of their workers, in the presence of credit market 
imperfections, the level of education would be suboptimal unless it is financed publicly. 
Thus the capitalist (unlike the landed) elite could favour the public provision (tax funded) 
of human capital. While Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) have alluded to the concept of 
elite dominance in the provision of public goods in the Indian districts, the issue remains 
virtually unexplored.  The present paper thus examines the effect of the presence of the 
dominant elite, both landed and capitalist on changes in public spending (rather than  
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public goods) with a view to explore difference, if any. 
Identification of the elite is an important part of this exercise. While the 
institutional literature (e.g., Galor and Moav, 2006) distinguishes between the landed and 
capitalist elite in the process of industrial revolution, one also needs to disentangle its link 
to the prevailing gender/caste composition of the population, which is specific to the 
Indian society. Along this line, the recent political economy literature has highlighted the 
importance of political representation of women and low caste population on the 
provision of public goods/services in India at different levels of administrative units. For 
example, Betancourt and Gleason (2000) suggested the selectivity in the allocation 
against Muslims and Scheduled castes in the allotment of nurses, doctors and teachers to 
rural areas of the Indian districts. Pande (2003) highlighted the benefits of political 
reservation of the Scheduled Caste (SC) and scheduled Tribes (ST) on public policy in 
the Indian states: while political reservation of SCs has been associated with an increased 
spending on job quotas, that of STs is associated with lower spending on education (but 
greater ST welfare spending) in the Indian states. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) too 
highlight the success of political reservation and ‘Garibi Hatao’ (i.e., poverty alleviation), 
among other national policies, on increased universal provision of public goods in the 
Indian districts over 1971-91 period, especially in favour of the scheduled castes  (and not 
so much the scheduled tribes), who have successfully organised themselves to gain some 
political power. Chattopadhyay and Dufflo (2004) have provided evidence for the 
distinctive role of female preferences in local policy making: village councils with 
reserved seats for women tend to invest more in drinking water, fuel and employment 
generating activities such as road construction (compared to those unreserved village 
councils) in a district in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal. None of this previous 
literature has however looked at the effect of minority representation in relation to the 
presence of the dominant elite; the present paper aims to fill in this gap of the literature.  
We distinguish between the dominant (landed and/or capitalist) and the minority 
(women and SC/ST representatives in the state legislature) elite and examine 
whether/how the minority elite could affect the pattern of public spending in favour of 
their cohorts. The underlying argument here is that the women and low caste people have 
lower incomes and are over-represented in Indian poverty estimates (see further  
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discussion in section 3.1) and thus are likely to be more risk-averse than the general 
population; accordingly, they are likely to benefit more from the redistributive public 
spending and thus may want to lobby for higher redistributive public spending. However, 
their effectiveness to influence public policy would depend on whether they have a voice 
(e.g., they may be under-represented in the government), preference (e.g., they may be 
more aligned with the ruling landed/capitalist elite) and/or any mandate (e.g., they may 
not be accountable to the minority population, especially if they are not elected by their 
cohorts) to serve their cohorts. The latter resonates the very limited literature on intra-
elite conflict/cooperation.
1  
The central question here is to explore whether the elite promotes the interests of 
the marginalised poor. Poverty is an endemic problem in India and poverty alleviation 
has remained an important objective of successive Indian governments as is highlighted 
in the ‘Garibi Hatao’ programme launched in the mid 1970s. While elite dominance 
largely influences the supply of public spending on education (a la Bourguignon and 
Verdier, 1999; Galor and Moav 2006), it is also important to assess to what extent the 
dominant elite are responsive to the poverty rates in the Indian states, if at all, and also if 
landed and capitalist elite respond differently to poverty. Thus one needs to take account 
of both demand and supply considerations. On the one hand, the elected representatives 
may have lower accountability towards the marginalised attributable to their lower 
turnout (especially among women and low caste voters and more so in the poorer states; 
see Table 3 and further discussion in section 2). On the other hand, the poor may have a 
lower demand for certain public goods, especially education, as has been highlighted in 
household-level evidence from low-income countries (e.g., see Glewwe and Jacoby). The 
result could be lower realised redistributive spending or lower provision of public 
goods/services in the poorer states. 
Acemoglu et al. (2007) have argued that political influence of the dominant elite 
(i.e. the rich) may give rise to emergence and persistence of inefficient political regimes 
that may utilise its patronage to bureaucrats to reduce the amount of redistribution and 
                                                 
1  While Acemoglu et al. (2007) suggested a co-operation between the dominant elite and the bureaucrats, 
anecdotal evidence suggests an alliance between the dominant (landed/capitalist elite) and the minority elite 
(i.e., minority representation in the government) in Indian politics (see further discussion in section 2). 
Thus the elected women and low caste representatives may not have the interest to serve their cohorts.  
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public goods provision even in a democracy. This kind of political regime is likely to be 
associated with higher spending on non-developmental account. This seems to be in line 
with the recent study of Sachs et al. (2000), who highlighted the recent growth in non-
developmental spending in the Indian states. Accordingly, we examine whether elite 
dominance could be associated with an increase in the non-developmental spending in the 
Indian states and whether there is a difference between the landed and the capitalist elite 
in this respect.   
Our analysis of state-level data for the period 1960-92
2 from the selected states 
highlights the differential effect of landed and capitalist elite on education spending: 
while greater influence of capitalist elite may boost education spending in the presence of 
higher poverty, that of the landed elite lowers it. After controlling for the presence of 
dominant landed/capitalist elite, minority representation tends to have a limited role. We 
find that a higher representation of SC/ST in the ruling party is associated with higher 
education spending though the effect is significant only at 10% level; women’s 
representation in the ruling party however fails to have a significant impact on education 
spending. In contrast, both capitalist and landed elite tend to enhance allocation of total 
development spending in the poorer states; the latter is likely to be related to the fact that 
there is no conflict of interest between the dominant elite and the masses in this respect.
3 
Dominance of the capitalist elite is, however, associated with higher non-developmental 
spending even in the presence of higher poverty, thus highlighting the cost of capitalist 
elite dominance. The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 describes the data, 




2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data-set used in the paper consists of state-level economic and political variables 
available from the World Bank (Ozler, Dutt and Ravallion, 1996; Besley and Burgess, 
2000), Election Commission of India and also Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1996). Our 
                                                 
2 See discussion in section 2 for the choice of sample period.  




analysis focuses on the 1960-92 period, before the introduction of the 73
rd amendment of 
the constitution. With these constitutional amendments, institutions at all levels witnessed 
some changes in their functions. As responsibility for education became decentralised, 
district-level personnel, school head masters and village education committees acquired 
many new responsibilities. These changes justify our focus on the period, 1960-92.  
While the union government is involved in general with the development of the 
core sectors, states have the primary responsibility for most social sectors including 
education, health, community and social services. A state-level analysis is thus 
appropriate, as Indian states have considerable decision making powers, especially in 
social and community development. Each state has an elected assembly headed by the 
chief minister and we label the ruling state government as a ‘political regime’. Political 
regimes may differ in terms of representation from and inclusion of different sections of 
population in their electoral base and thus could result in differences in the policy choices 
under different regimes.   
The data points are the election years. The idea is that elected politicians will want 
to attain their targets by the time of the next election when the electorate decides whether 
to re-elect them. In most cases elections take place every five years, though there can be 
an election before the next scheduled one if the government in power collapses. There 
can however be problems in the estimates if, for example, policies implemented in year 
four take a further two years to complete, so that the model will assign the effect to the 
next election cycle. While we need to be cautious in interpreting these results, one 
election cycle lag appears to be the best available option.  
 
2.1. Elite dominance in India 
India is an interesting case in point where social, economic and political dominance of the 
elite (landed/capitalist/both) is closely interlinked with the age-old institution of caste and 
gender. Although many other nations are characterized by social inequality, perhaps 
nowhere else in the world has inequality been so elaborately constructed as in the Indian 
institution of caste.  
Castes are ranked, named, endogamous (in-marrying) groups, membership in 
which is achieved by birth. Many castes are traditionally associated with an occupation,  
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such as high-ranking Brahmans (priests); middle-ranking farmer and artisan groups, such 
as potters, barbers, and carpenters; and very low-ranking leatherworkers, butchers, 
launderers, and latrine cleaners. Since the 1990s, many politically aware members of the 
lowest castes prefer to call themselves ‘Dalit’, a Hindi word meaning oppressed or 
downtrodden. Since 1935 "Dalits" were known as Scheduled Castes, referring to their 
listing on government rosters, or schedules. Numerous groups usually called tribes (often 
referred to as Scheduled Tribes) are also integrated into the caste system to varying 
degrees. Some tribes live separately from others, particularly in the far northeast and in 
the forested center of the country, where tribes are more like ethnic groups than castes. 
After independence, Ambedkar (a Dalit leader) almost single-handedly wrote India's 
constitution, including key provisions barring caste-based discrimination. Nonetheless, 
discriminatory treatment of Dalits, especially Dalit women, remains a fact of daily life, 
even in the twenty-first century. 
There are close correlations between caste hierarchy and ownership of both land 
and non-land assets and economic prosperity in India. Members of higher-ranking castes 
tend, on the whole, to own more land and non-land assets and thus are more prosperous 
than members of lower-ranking castes. Many lower-caste people lack any assets and live 
in conditions of abject poverty and social disadvantage. Deshpande (2001) has 
constructed a composite caste deprivation index (CDI) for India that includes 
landholding, assets, livestock, education, and occupation. There is evidence that caste 
development is consistently worse for the backward castes (SC and ST) compared to 
others in all the states though the extent of the difference between these caste groups may 
vary across the states.  
There is conflicting evidence about the role of women in India. The constitution 
of modern India guarantees equal rights to men and women. India has been one of the 
first countries in the world to confer voting rights to its women. There is however a 
parallel body of evidence that seems to challenge the former view. Unlike most other 
societies, men outnumber women in India suggesting higher rates of female child 
mortality rates. According to 1998-99 National Family Health Survey data, women’s 
average age at marriage has been less than 20 years while about 58% of 13-19 years old 
were mothers; these young mothers have little control over their own fertility and  
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reproductive health; they face nutritional discrimination within the family, eating last and 
least. More than a quarter of 6-17 year old girls do not attend schools. There are far fewer 
women in the paid workforce than men; women’s wages are lower than men, even for the 
same work. Women are under-represented in governance and decision making position; 
there were less than 8% women in parliamentary seats, 6% in cabinet positions and less 
than 4% women judges in High court and Supreme Court of the country even in the 
1990s (Menon-Sen and Shivkumar, 2001).  
Social dominance of men and upper caste elite has naturally been translated into 
the political arena even within India’s democratic set-up. While the Indian Constitution of 
1950 ensures reservation of jurisdictions in favour of the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes in the state legislature as well as union Parliament, there has been no 
reservation for women at these levels. 
 It was only the 73
rd amendment of the Indian 
Constitution in 1993 that allowed reservation of seats for women in the village council. 
Following the 73
rd amendment of the Constitution, discussion is now under way about the 
reservation of seats for women at the state and national levels as well. A number of 
factors however continue to constrain minority participation at all levels of administration 
including their lack of political experience and public skills, threat of violence, motion of 
no-confidence often brought by male/upper caste members. Thus the gender/caste gap 
persists in political representation. 
 
 
2.2. Measures of elite dominance 
In order to capture different dimensions of elite dominance in the Indian states, we 
distinguish the dominant and the minority elite from the masses of the marginalised 
people.  
 
The dominant elite 
The dominant elite are the rich with more land or capital or both who are on the top end 
of the income distribution. Land is both the main productive asset and the basis of 
survival of the majority of the population in India still today, especially in rural areas. 
Thus land tenure is the foundation of social structure and political power. Very often  
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there is also a close correspondence between caste and ownership of land in the Indian 
society; thus upper caste people often enjoy a much greater share of land while the low 
caste people turn out to be landless or marginal farmers. One could form some idea of 
economic dominance of the elite, especially in the rural areas, from the distribution of 
land in these states. Table 1 shows the average percentage of total land area held by top 
5% and bottom 40% of the population and also the Gini coefficient in the distribution of 
land (LANDGINI) over 1960-92. Since there is very little variation in the Gini index of 
land distribution, we use the land held by the top 5% of the population (TOP5); in 
particular, a greater share of land held by the top 5% of the population is used here as an 
index of economic dominance of the landed elite.
4 Table 1 clearly demonstrates the 
extent of the discrepancy in the distribution of land between top 5% (TOP5) and bottom 
40% of the population in all the states; moderate degree of discrepancy persists in most 
other states. 
One also needs to distinguish the capitalist elite from the landed elite, especially 
in the context of industrial development that gathered pace in India since the late 1970s. 
Firm ownership in developing countries is not only more concentrated than in the west, 
but often concentrated within family holdings. India has been no exception where leading 
families typically own controlling shares, either directly or through cross-holdings of 
firms belonging to the same business group. Leading business groups in India includes 
Tata and Birla (starting in 1900s), Goenka, Khaitan (starting in 1950s), Ambanis (starting 
in 1960s) and Wipro, Infosys, Ranbaxy (in the 1990s).
5 Given that most emerging 
countries have only nascent markets for corporate control, families remain well 
entrenched in the firms they control. It is also remarkable that the family business groups 
continued to dominate the Indian corporate landscape over past seven decades, despite 
changes in the economic/political regimes (Khanna and Palepu, 2004). In the early 1990s, 
Indian corporate sector had the following profile. There were a little more than 100 state-
                                                 
4 We also try the percentage of land held by the bottom 40% of the population in our empirical analysis 
though it was never significant. That is why these results are not shown. 
5 The Tata Group of India, for example, has member firms that operate in the steel, automobile, telecom, 
software, beverage and leisure industries, among others. In some cases, business groups were created to 
help create internal capital markets in environments where capital markets as such were imperfect. In other 
cases, they were responses to regulatory barriers (e.g., the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
in India) that did not allow expansion of operations in one industry, forcing a firm to seek growth in 
another, sometimes unrelated industry.  
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owned enterprises and about 2500 relatively smaller publicly traded private companies, 
about 50% of whom were affiliated to business groups. Private sector companies 
associated with business groups had significantly higher concentrated family ownership 
and substantial assets. Khanna and Palepu (2004) noted that with the evolution of 
government industrial policies since independence, there have been changes in the 
relationship between the influential business groups and government in power; however 
political connection has not been the sole factor behind the success of these groups. It is 
however not possible to obtain the state-level information on ownership concentration of 
the private sector companies as there is no restriction on regional operations of any 
private firm in India. Consequently, the measure used to identify the presence of the 
capitalist elite relates to an index of industrialization, which is the share of manufacturing 
output in net state domestic product. The idea is that more industrialised states have 
greater capital investment often made by the controlling owners, thus indicating a greater 
presence of capitalist elite; this is also highlighted in the fact that the correlation 
coefficient between factory fixed capital and net state domestic product from 
manufacturing turns out to be 0.98 in our sample and it is also significant at less than 1% 
level. Table 1 highlights the extent of inter-state variation in the extent of 
industrialization in the sample states.  
 
 
The minority elite   
The minority elite refer to the elected women and low caste representatives in the state 
government. It is important to distinguish them from the dominant elite as the nature of 
their influence in the ruling government may be quite different from the dominant elite. 
In particular, following Lott and Kenny (1999), one could argue that the political 
representation of women and low caste people (i.e., the minority elite) in the ruling party 
could favour redistributive public spending as they are poorer and more risk-averse. 
Pande (2003) and Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) highlight the benefits of political 
reservation of SC/ST in favour of the community they represent. The argument could 
however be weakened in a number of cases: (a) the minority elite could be under-
represented in the government and therefore lack the voice to influence public policies in  
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their favour. While political reservation of SC/ST in the government represents their 
population shares, in the absence of any political reservation, women’s representation 
continues to be very marginal in the sample states (see Table 1 and further discussion 
below). (b) In a democratic set-up minority representation could influence policy decision 
in favour of their communities if they have a mandate to serve the particular community. 
However, lower voter turnout among women and low caste people, especially in the 
poorer states, could make the elected women and low caste representatives less 
accountable to their cohorts, especially if they are not elected by their cohorts.
6 (c) One 
cannot also rule out the possibility of an alliance between the dominant and the minority 
elite (women and low caste elected members) in the government, which may induce the 
latter not to act in the interests of their cohorts (e.g., see Acemoglu et al. 2007; Ghosal 
and Proto, 2007). 
The pre-1993 period was marked by the predominance of the Indian National 
Congress (INC) regime in most states, especially until 1977, important exceptions being 
Tamil Nadu and Kerala, where alternative regimes came to power as early as 1967 (rise 
of other regional parties have had a more recent origin in the Indian states). The social 
base for the Congress had traditionally been the landed elite and the rural habitations they 
controlled, resulting in a dominance of the upper castes in Congress politics, especially in 
the first 30 years after independence. While the Dalits were a crucial Congress vote bank 
in a majority of individual States, they did not cling to Congress in regions where another 
party or movement rose to prominence. Within Congress the importance of the Dalit vote 
however did not translate itself into great influence for individual Dalits in either the 
organisation or the ministry. Low social standing has also made individual Dalit 
spokesmen relatively easy targets for political demolition. Dalits have therefore tended to 
construct their political careers as dependants within factions led by high-caste 
politicians.  
Under-representation of women in Indian politics is a well-known fact; what is 
more disappointing is how little has changed in this respect since Independence. 
Women’s presence (as share of total seats) in Lok Sabha (lower house of the Parliament) 
                                                 
6 In section 3 we have examined if there is a direct correlation between election of women and low caste 
representatives and turnout among women and low caste voters in the sample states.   
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fluctuates between 3%-8% over 1952-98 and the average turns out to be 6%. Very often 
these women come from an elite upper caste background (note that representation of 
women from the low caste back ground in the state government remains a rare 
phenomenon even in the 21
st century)
7 with some political tradition in the family or being 
close to a prominent male leader. Also more ambitious women members of the legislative 
assembly will choose to speak about issues not relating to women’s affairs, but those 
relating to industry, trade, economy and international relations, where power and 
influence converge. Thus women politicians, like the Dalit politicians very often co-opted 
for the dominant elite (landed/capitalist) and thus have not been spokespersons for their 
own cohorts.  
  Our measure of the minority elite in the Indian states pertains to the proportions of 
women and scheduled caste/tribe legislators in the ruling party as a share of total seats 
won by the ruling party in the state assembly. We believe that this is the pertinent 
measure as these are the people who could in principle influence policy decisions of the 
government. The average values of these measures of political elite dominance in our 
sample are summarized in Table 1. These figures clearly highlight the low representation 
of the members of the marginalized groups, especially women, in the ruling government 
in all the sample states over this period. 
8 
 
The marginalised  
Setting aside the dominant and the minority elite, there remains the masses of 
marginalised groups of poor where women and low caste people are over-represented. 
These marginalised people are not only worse off compared to the general population 
when residing in any state of India, they are more so when residing in the poorly 
performing states like Bihar, MP, Orissa, Rajasthan or UP. The latter is closely related to 
the fact that often female-headed (especially widows) and low-caste households have 
                                                 
7 Following the 73
rd amendment of the Constitution in 1993, there has however been reservation for women 
in the village councils in India; the latter may have paved the way for greater women’s representation at the 
higher levels of administrative units. It will therefore be interesting to update this study beyond the sample 
period. 
8 As possible alternatives, we also considered proportions of (i) women and scheduled caste/tribe legislators 
in the ruling party as a share of all women and scheduled caste/tribe legislators in the state assembly; (ii) 
proportions of women and scheduled caste/tribe legislators in the ruling party as a share of total reserved 
and unreserved seats respectively. However results were rather similar.  
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limited assets (beyond their own unskilled labour) and thus they are forced to participate 
in various casual (rather than regular) farm/non-farm jobs. The latter may explain why 
these minority groups are over-represented in poverty (Drèze and Srinivsan, 1997; Parker 
and Kozel, 2007).  
Indian poverty is linked to economic, social and cultural factors that interact to 
maintain long-term structural disparities in the distribution of resources and social 
opportunities. Thus the poor are found to be a highly heterogeneous group: they have 
limited physical assets (e.g., land), low education and often suffer from health problems. 
They are also deprived of formal/informal system of support and social capital (Parker 
and Kozel, 2007). 
Despite their numerical strength, the voices of the poor are not heard through the 
ballot box. Column (4) of Table 2 shows the average voter turnout among women and 
low caste voters relative to all voters. Clearly voter turn out rates are significantly lower 
among these marginalized people and more so in the worse performing states like Bihar, 
Orissa, MP and UP (despite their high share in the population). In addition to an apathy 
towards the political process that fails to include them in the process of Indian 
development, the latter could be a result of the criminalisation of politics that resulted in 
many criminals being elected (e.g., see Dréze and Sen, 1995), especially in the Hindi 
heartland of North India (including some of the worst performing states like UP and 
Bihar), threatening/bribing the electorate during election times to vote or not to vote in a 
certain way, especially those less educated and marginalised and therefore vulnerable in a 
caste-based society.  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our analysis is developed in three steps. First we examine the role of elite dominance on 
the changing share of state-level spending on education (as a proportion of state domestic 
product), distinguishing between the landed and capitalist elite (see section 3.2). Second, 
education is only one component of total development spending. It is also interesting to 
assess if elite dominance may have similar effect on total development spending as well 
(section 3.3). Finally, given the recent steady increase in non-developmental spending in  
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the Indian states, we examine if the elite have any preference for non-development (as 
opposed to development) account of public spending (section 3.4).  
 
3.1. Determination of Changes in Public Spending  
In this section, we examine the factors determining the changing share of state spending 
on education, development and non-development account of total state spending (as a 
share of state output). Taking the share of some account of public spending in relation to 
state domestic product allows us to control for a state’s wealth.  
 
Dependent variable 
We choose the change in the value of the particular spending variable from the last 
election to be the dependent variable. This differenced variable allows us to examine how 
the political regime would change the behaviour of the government in power while the 
level variable would simply reflect the correlation between political variables and the 
spending on education. Using the first difference of the state spending on education also 
allows us to reduce the possible problem of simultaneity arising from the inclusion of 
some of the explanatory variables (see further discussion below). 
This allows us to determine changes in any account of spending ∆Yit as function 
of one period lagged values of the explanatory variables, Xit, as follows:  
1 ' it it ii t Y X β α ε − ∆= + +    (1) 
where  αi  is the state-specific fixed effects.  We also examine the robustness of our 
estimates by including an additional time fixed effect, γt: 
1 ' it it ii t t Y X β γ α ε − ∆= + + +    (2) 
Use of one-period (i.e., 4-6 years) lagged explanatory variables, including measures of 
elite dominance in the determination of changes in education spending would minimize 
the possibility of endogeneity bias in our analysis (related econometric issues are 
discussed below). Accordingly, we use fixed effects (both state and time fixed-effects) 
panel data model to determine the first differences in the public spending on education, 





We use the same set of explanatory variables in determining the three dependent 
variables of our choice, namely, changing share of education spending, development 
spending and non-development spending.  
First we include the initial value of public spending (on education, development 
or non-development account, depending on the particular dependent variable of our 
choice) and expect a negative sign on its coefficient; the latter would indicate 
convergence, if any, in the level of this spending among the states over time, conditional 
on values of other covariates.  
As discussed earlier, we include different measures of the dominant elite relating 
to the ownership of land or capital. Among various possible alternative measures of 
dominance exercised by the landed elite
9, we use the proportion of land held by top 5% of 
the population (TOP5). In order to explore the differential role of the dominance of 
capitalist elite (vis-à-vis the dominance of landed elite), if any, we include an index of 
state industrialization (share of manufacturing output to total state net domestic product) 
in specification (2).
10 In addition to two measures of dominant elite, we include the 
measure of minority elite, i.e., the proportion of elected women and low caste members in 
the ruling government. This enables us to examine if the minority representation in the 
state assembly yields any favourable and significant impact on changes in public 
spending, even in the presence of dominant elite.  
In the context of the Indian poverty alleviation programme, e.g., ‘Garibi Hatao’, it 
is also useful to assess the role of poverty. Following our discussion in section 2.2, it 
could be argued that the inclusion of the poverty rate could represent the marginalised 
and thus capture the accountability of the state to cater to their demand (or lack of it) for 
education.
11 In an attempt to account for the interaction, if any, between measures of elite 
                                                 
9 As possible alternative measures of elite dominance, we also tried including Gini index in the distribution 
of landholding, the share of land held by the top 10% and bottom 40% of the population; but these variables 
never turned out to be significant.  
10 Given the close and significant correlations between measures of land distribution (Top5) and share of 
manufacturing (see Table 4), we also include these measures one at a time rather than both together; 
however results were similar, These results will be available on request. 
11 Following the large household-level evidence in the low-income countries (e.g., see Glewwe and Jacoby, 
2004), some may also argue that the poor have lower demand for education. Thus poverty is likely to be 
associated with lower spending on education.  
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dominance and poverty, we include two interaction terms, namely, TOP5*HCR and 
MFG*HCR in addition to HCR. These interaction terms would reflect the responses of 
the dominant elite to the presence of the marginalized.
12 
In addition to the measures of dominant and minority elite as well as the 
marginalised, we control for the variation in ethnic heterogeneity of the states, which has 
been identified as a key control variable in some previous studies.  
There is some recent literature that stresses the link between ethnic 
fractionalisation and the poor delivery of public services (e.g., see Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly, 2000). Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) have extended the idea of ethnic 
diversity for the provision of public goods in the Indian districts and suggest that more 
heterogeneous communities tend to be politically weaker and therefore are less likely to 
get the goods they want and are more likely to get some of the inferior substitutes.  
Indian society has traditionally been multireligious (including 82% of the Hindus 
along with minority groups of Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains in these 
states). This social structure is further complicated by the prevailing caste system among 
the Hindus that distinguishes between the upper caste (16%), other backward castes 
(43.7), scheduled caste (15%) and scheduled tribe (7.5%)
13, giving rise to a pluralistic 
society. We construct a direct composite measure of ethnic fractionalisation from the 
population proportions belonging to various ethno-religious groups including upper caste 
Hindus, scheduled caste, scheduled tribes, Muslims, Jains, Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs 
and others, as 1-∑pi
2, where pi is the share of the particular population group. It is 
expected that the coefficient of this variable would be negative in the determination of 
change in education spending. This is because a greater degree of heterogeneity would 
mean that the ruling party caters to a smaller segment of the total population with a lower 
provision of public goods/services. Inter-state variation in the average values of social 
heterogeneity measure is summarised in Table 2 for the study period 1960-92.
 14 Means 
                                                 
12 We also attempted to include the interaction terms between the dominant and the minority elite – 
however these interaction terms were never significant in any specification. 
13 Source: Government of India, Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Mandal Commission 
Report), First Part, Vol. 1 (1980), p. 56. These figures are best estimates. The last caste census was taken in 
1931. 
14 We also tried including an indicator variable measuring if the state government is aligned to the 
government at the centre. INC has remained in power at the centre during most of this period, except 1977-
80 (Janata Party rule), 1989-90 (National Front coalition government). Thus the binary variable takes a  
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and standard deviations of all explanatory variables are shown in Table 3; Table 4 in 
addition shows the correlations between various measures of elite dominance. 
 
Some econometric considerations 
We start our analysis with some non-parametric Kernel fit. The advantage of the non-
parametric approach is that it does not specify the functional form; rather it allows the 
data to determine the appropriate nature of the functional form. We consider the bivariate 
relationship between (a) land held by top 5% of the population and changes in education 
spending, and also that between (b) share of manufacturing and changes in education 
spending for each state, and in each case use kernel regression to fit a relationship 
between each pair of variables. These fitted lines are shown in Appendix Figure 1 for 
selected states over the sample period. In general, the relationship tends to be negative for 
(a) and positive for (b); there are some exceptions too: e.g., relationship (a) is much 
flatter in Haryana and Maharashtra than AP and Orissa while some non-linearity is 
observed with respect to (b) in most states illustrated. We shall examine the nature of 
these relationships, after controlling for all other possible covariates that we describe 
below. 
An important identification issue in our analysis pertains to the fact that the 
factors that may cause measures of elite dominance to change over time may also have a 
direct impact on education spending and therefore its changes. In the absence of a 
randomized experiment, we try to generate a ‘natural experiment’. One possible way of 
doing so is to examine the nature of education spending in states with close election; in 
the light of the available information, we determine changes in state-level education 
spending by considering the years when a coalition government has been in power in the 
sample states. The latter allows us to test whether the dominant elite may still dominate 
the policy decisions. Note however that this means that our sample size is now reduced to 
only 31 observations across the states and over time. Given the limited number of 
observations we fail to apply fixed effects estimates; OLS estimates of changes in 
                                                                                                                                                   
value 1 if the party in power at the state assembly is also the party in power at the centre and 0 otherwise. 
Alliance with the union could be important in determining both earning and spending patterns of the state 
(e.g., see Khemani, 2003). But the variable was never significant in explaining change in state level 




education spending yield much weaker results (as reflected in signs and significance of 
estimated coefficients); in particular, the effect of landed, capitalist or minority elite as 
such loses significance. One possible interpretation of this weaker result could be that the 
dominant elite loses its policy influence in case of close election; yet the possibility 
remains that this weaker result is attributable to the small sample size in this special 
case.
15  
  A related problem pertains to the treatment of the unobserved variables not 
included in our analysis. Note however that the use of (state-specific) fixed effects model 
by its very nature allows us to control for any state-specific unobserved factors that may 
affect the relationship. So long as these other (omitted/unobserved) variables are state-
specific, our estimates would be unbiased. One may however raise the question that these 
state-specific (unobserved) fixed effects do not control for the possibility of endogeneity 
being introduced by unobserved time-varying factors that we have not controlled for, 
especially for measures of the dominant/minority elite. We could however defend that the 
Gini index in the distribution of landholding (e.g., see McKay and Pal, 2004) and/or 
women’s representation in the state assembly remain relatively stable during the sample 
period. In an alternative specification, we also include both state- and time- specific fixed 
effects. 
Finally, one also needs to tackle the issue of reverse causality; for example, 
certain types of people (dominant and/or minority elite) may get elected depending on 
what they promise regarding government spending on education. In an attempt to test the 
exogeneity of measures of elite dominance we follow a regression based approach 
suggested by Hausman (1978, 1983); in fact a regression based test is asymptotically 
equivalent to the original form of the Hausman test. This is explained below.  
Given that the set of explanatory variables X in equation (1) and (2) includes 
some potentially endogenous variables like share of land held by the top 5% of the 
population (TOP5), share of manufacturing (MFG), proportion of SC/ST (PSCST) and 
women (PWOM) members in the ruling government, we need to correct for the potential 
endogeneity. We proceed as follows: (a) we regress each of these potentially endogenous 
                                                 




variables on a set of explanatory variables Z which includes some additional variables 
(e.g., coalition government, president’s rule) over and above what is included in X. Note 
that Z replaces the particular potentially endogenous variable by its relevant instrument. 
In particular, we instrument TOP5 by population density in the state, MFG by the share 
of factory fixed capital in factory value added at the state level, PSCST by the proportion 
of SC/ST population in each state and PWOM by the proportion of women in the state. 
Note that population density, proportion of SC/ST and women in the state are all 
demographic variables and thus choice of these instruments has been dictated by their 
likely exogeneity in relation to the dependent variable. In each case, we obtain the 
estimated residuals for each of these potentially endogenous variables, namely, resTOP5, 
resMFG, resSCST, resWOM; we also derive the residuals for the two interaction 
variables TOP5*HCR and MFG*HCR. (b) In the final stage we include these estimated 
residuals as additional explanatory variables in (1). Statistical insignificance (i.e., the 
relevant t-statistics) of these estimated residuals would constitute a test of exogeneity. We 
have also tested the sensitivity of these results by choosing alternative instruments for 
share of manufacturing, e.g., literacy rate or adult literacy rate. Results were unchanged, 
perhaps reflecting the fact that all explanatory variables are 4-6 years lagged values. 
Uncorrected and corrected estimates are shown in Tables 5-7; insignificance of the 
estimated residuals establishes the exogeniety of all potentially endogenous variables and 
their interaction terms. 
 
3.2. Estimates of changes in education spending 
Following our discussion in section 3.1, we obtain estimates of changes in education 
spending with (a) only state and (b) both state and time specific fixed effects. These 
estimates are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. In an attempt to test for the 
potential endogeneity of some of the key measures of elite dominance, we estimate the 
augmented model using estimated residuals of these potentially endogenous variables and 
their possible interaction terms. These corrected estimates are shown in column (3) and 
(4) respectively for fixed effects models with only state fixed effects and both state and 
time fixed effects. Note however that none of the residual terms (resTOP5, resMFg, 
resSCST and resWOM) are significant in specification (3) and (4), thus establishing the  
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exogeneity of these measures in our sample.  
A positive (negative) coefficient estimate would indicate an increase (decrease) in 
the share of education spending associated with an increase in the value of the particular 
explanatory variable in the last election year. F-statistics for the joint test of significance 
of the explanatory variables are significant at less than 1% level in each case. Our 
analysis in the rest of this paper focuses on the corrected estimates. 
The initial level of education spending is positive though only significant in 
specification (1) at 10% level; thus there is no evidence of convergence in public 
spending on education across the sample states and could perhaps be rationalised in terms 
of the divergent agenda of the ruling political regimes in the sample states over the 
sample period. Secondly, the coefficient estimate of ethnic heterogeneity is highly 
significant and negative, as expected. This is in conformity with the findings of Banerjee 
and Somanathan (2007) that regions with higher ethnic heterogeneity tend to have lower 
spending on education.  
There is also evidence that poverty rates have a significant effect on education, 
even after accounting for the presence of elite dominance. In particular, higher poverty is 
associated with lower education spending, as predicted. This could be a reflection of the 
under-representation of the poor in the government, lower accountability of the elected 
members towards the poor (who often have lower voter-turnout), and/or lower demand 
for education among the poor.  
Finally we consider the estimates of measures of elite dominance, ceteris paribus. 
Here we focus on the estimates using the land held by the top 5% of the population as a 
measure of landed elite. While a greater share of land held by the top 5% of the 
population continues to be insignificant as such, the interaction term TOP5*HCR is 
always negative and significant in Table 5; in other words the landed elite seems to be 
unresponsive to the presence of the poor. In contrast, the interaction term between MFG 
and HCR is always positive and significant here; the latter suggests a contrasting trend in 
that the presence of capitalist elite is associated with higher education spending if poverty 
rates are high, thus supporting Galor and Moav (2006).  
After controlling for the presence of dominant landed/capitalist elite, neither 
SC/ST nor women representation has any significant impact on changes in education  
 
21
spending. The latter perhaps validates the general wisdom that a greater degree of 
minority representation in the ruling government as such cannot by itself induce higher 
investment in public education (see discussion in section 2.2), especially if these 
members do not have any preference/voice/mandate to serve these marginalised people.
  
Clearly women are under-represented in government (Table 2) while 
representation of the low (SC/ST) caste is proportional to their population share in the 
state. Moreover, in many cases the elected representatives of the minority group may be 
aligned with the dominant elite, thus suggesting their lack of voice/preferences to serve 
their cohorts. While we cannot directly test the latter, we can indirectly test if the 
minority elite have any mandate to serve their people. In doing so, we examine if the 
winning seat in the state assembly won by a woman/low caste member is closely 
correlated with the turnout among female/low caste voters. This is because if there is no 
such correlation it would not be necessary for these members to cater to these 
communities. Our results (available on request) do suggest that there is no significant 
association between turnout among low caste voters and the election of low-caste 
members in the assembly, after controlling for illiteracy rate, ethnic heterogeneity of the 
state over the study period.  
 
3.2.1. Comparison with the existing literature 
The question that naturally arises here is how our results are related to the existing 
literature. Clearly our reference points are Pande (2003) and Banerjee and Somanathan 
(2007) (BS henceforth). BS relate to the effect of SC/ST population share on changing 
provision of various public goods over 1971-91 in the Indian districts, while Pande 
(2003) analysed the effect of SC/ST reservations in state assemblies on levels of public 
spending on different accounts (as a share of total spending) over a period of 1960-92 in 
the Indian states using annual data. With respect to the provision of schools, BS found 
that ST dominated areas received more primary schools (effects for middle and high 
schools were insignificant though), while SC dominated areas received less high schools 
(effects for primary and middle schools were insignificant) during 1971-1991 period. 
Pande found that SC reservations have significantly positive effect on job quotas (not its 
changes) while ST reservations had pronounced positive effects on ST welfare spending,  
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but negative effects on education spending. So the results remain mixed.  
We examine the changes in education as shares of state domestic product (which 
allows us to control for the variation in state-level prosperity) using a more 
comprehensive framework. We not only control for the minority representation in the 
ruling government, but also control for the presence of the dominant elite (landed and 
capitalist), poverty rate and ethnic heterogeneity. We also account for the possible 
interaction between poverty HCR and presence of the dominant (landed and capitalist) 
elite. Ceteris paribus, we found that representation of SC/ST members fails to have any 
significant effect on changes in education spending. While Pande did not control for the 
distribution of land or capital across the states, BS controlled for Gini coefficient in the 
distribution of land though did not find it significant. While we also find that Gini is 
insignificant in our analysis, share of land held by the top 5% of the population is 
significant; similarly, the effect of share of manufacturing turns out to be significant.  
Appendix Table A1 summarises the results of various alternative specifications 
starting from the simplest possible scenario; this suggests how inclusion of additional 
controls for the presence of dominant elite may change our estimates. Specifications (1) 
and (2) constitute the baseline model without any control for elite dominance. (1) 
includes only low caste representation variable while (2) includes both low caste and 
women’s representation variables. In these specifications low caste representation has 
significant and positive impact on education spending. With the inclusion of controls for 
landed and capitalist elite as in specifications (3) and (5), low caste representation loses 
its significance on education spending. However, presence of landed elite lowers 
education spending while that of capitalist elite enhances it. Specifications (4) and (6) in 
addition include the poverty rate and its interaction with the measures of dominant elite, 
which in turn suggest that the landed elite do not respond to the poverty rate while the 
capitalist elite do. Finally, estimates of our complete specifications, as shown in Table 5, 
highlight that after including controls for dominant and minority elite, the minority elite, 
i.e., representation of the low caste and women in the government as such fail to have a 
significant effect; additional analysis suggests that there is no significant relationship 
between the election of a low caste representative and the turnout of low caste voters in 




3.3. Changes in Developmental Spending 
Education is only one component of total development spending incurred by the Indian 
states. In addition to education, total development spending also includes spending on 
health, family welfare, community building, etc. The natural question to ask here is 
whether the dominant elite behave similarly with respect to total development spending 
(as opposed to education spending) in the Indian states. We include the same set of 
explanatory variables as in Table 5 to explain changes in total development spending; 
these fixed effects estimates are shown in Table 6. One particular result needs to be 
highlighted here: unlike education spending, both landed and capitalist elite tend to 
respond to the underlying poverty rate, and they do so by increasing spending on 
development account in the poorer states. However none of the measures of the presence 
of the minority elite turn out to be significant in determining development spending. In 
other words, there is some confirmation that the differential effect of landed and capitalist 
elite as we have seen for education spending does not seem to hold for overall 
development spending. 
  
3.4. Non-developmental Spending 
Recently Sachs et al. (2000) argued that the resource constraints in state finances in India 
have been accentuated by a near stagnant tax-GDP ratio, a rising share of non-
developmental outlay in the total expenditure, large volumes of hidden or implicit 
subsidies and increasing financial losses of state enterprises while a growing pressure on 
state finances has stemmed from the rising demand for public services. The critical 
problem in state finances is not only one of high levels of expenditure (relative to revenue 
mobilization), but also one of increasing distortions in the pattern of expenditure as 
reflected in an increase in non-developmental spending relative to developmental 
spending. One possible explanation of this trend could be related to the presence of a 
dominant elite that may use its influence over the minority elite (e.g., bureaucrats as in 
Acemoglu et al. 2007; elected representatives of the minority groups as in our case) to 
reduce the amount of redistributive public spending, resulting in higher non-development 
spending. Accordingly, we explore if the presence of the dominant elite has been one of  
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the explanations for the trend increase in non-developmental spending (as a share of state 
output) in the Indian states in recent years. As before, we use fixed effects estimates and 
these results are shown in Table 7. 
  First, there is evidence of significant divergence among the Indian states as 
states with higher initial non-developmental spending tend to have higher spending and 
there is no sign of catching up here. Second, these estimates seem to suggest some 
preference of the dominant elite (both landed and capitalist) for non-development 
spending. Indeed there is some confirmation that a dominance of both landed and 
capitalist elite is associated with significantly higher non-developmental spending, even 
when poverty rates are higher; the effect although positive remains insignificant for the 
landed elite in specifications (4). As before representation of women or low caste fails to 
have any perceptible effect on non-development spending in any specification. Taken 
together, these results could be indicative of a possible alliance between the dominant and 
the minority elite, among other possibilities. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper examines the role of elite dominance as a possible explanation of the low 
levels of literacy in India, especially among women and low castes, who are significantly 
worse off than the general population, and more so when residing in the worse 
performing states. India is an important case in point where the identification of the elite 
is not only related to the distribution of land and non-land resources, but also to the age-
old institution of gender/caste (and its close link with the distribution of land and non-
land resources and therefore poverty). Despite its importance, the issue is little 
understood in the Indian context, if at all.  
We argue that the systematic under-investment in public education could reflect 
the preferences of the dominant elite, especially the landed elite; the elite will oppose 
mass education because the educated people are more likely to demand political power, 
thus diluting the authority of the elite. Given the productive co-operation between the 
workers and the capitalist, the latter may however be willing to favour public spending on 
education, especially in the presence of credit market imperfections. While minority  
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representation of women and low caste people in the government could boost 
redistributive spending on certain accounts, its effectiveness could be limited by (a) the 
minority under-representation in the government so that these minority elite may not have 
the voice in the government, (b) a possible alliance of the dominant elite with the 
minority elite, which may alter the preference of the minority elite away from serving 
their cohorts; (c) non-accountability of the minority elected officials towards the 
marginalised people. Point (c) could be particularly important in the poorer states with 
lower voter turn-out, especially among women and low caste people and also a possible 
lack of demand for education among the poor.   
There is evidence from the state-level panel-data analysis in the paper that the 
landed elite tend to be unresponsive to the underlying poverty rate. In contrast, presence 
of the capitalist elite is associated with higher education spending, if underlying poverty 
rate is high. After controlling for the presence of the dominant elite, women and low caste 
representation in the ruling party however fails to have any statistically significant impact 
on education spending. In contrast, both capitalist and landed elite respond significantly 
to the presence of poverty in the allocation of total development spending; presence of 
the dominant elite is, however, associated with higher non-developmental spending even 
in the presence of higher poverty.  
Unlike the previous literature, our analysis highlights the importance of 
accounting for the conflict/cooperation between the dominant and the minority elite. 
Ensuring political representation of the marginalized people (women and low caste) is not 
sufficient to erode their initial disadvantages; clearly land reform and industrialization 
could boost public spending on education. This is, however, not an isolated process and 
needs to be implemented in conjunction with the financial sector reforms, thus enabling 
the marginalized people to take advantage of the pro-market reforms, credit opportunities 
as well as to consciously participate in the political process (and make an informed 
choice). Impartial judiciary has also a very important role to play to uphold this crucial 
fundamental right, especially in its fight against criminalisation of the political process. 
‘Class based politics perpetuates inequality; spread of human capital could help to 
overcome the traditional disparities of class, caste and gender, allowing individuals to 
take advantage of available resources and social opportunity, just as the removal of these  
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inequalities helps the spread of human capital.’ It would thus be interesting to examine 
whether/how pro-market reforms could change the balance of power between the 
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  % of land held by      Minority elite [1] 




















AP  44.10  61.1  0.14  41.4  0.79 0.74 1.58 4.00  22.2 
Assam 52.90  64.3  0.09  25.6  2.53 0.60 2.18 3.1  24.6 
Bihar  38.50  47.5  0.12  34.6  1.76 0.68 4.61 4.7  22.7 
Gujarat  61.30  70.0  0.21  31.7  0.73 0.69 3.33 6.8  36.2 
Haryana  55.80  68.6  0.14  -  - - - 7.5  22.9 
J&K  -  54.5  0.06  21.5  10.43  0.49 1.45 1.7  3.9 
Karnataka  56.00  67.0  0.15  32.8  1.29 0.67 2.55 5.2  21.2 
Kerala 89.80  90.9  0.13  42.3  7.95 0.69 5.64 1.7  7.2 
MP  44.20  64.1  0.10  29.7  2.61 0.63 3  6.7  46.8 
Maharastra  64.90  77.3  0.26  33.2  0.58 0.70 1.97 5.8  18.0 
Orissa 49.10  63.6  0.09  31.3  2.26 0.64 5.33 5.0  53.9 
Punjab 58.50  69.9  0.11  37.1  -  0.74 0.64 5.0  23.6 
Rajasthan  38.60  61.0  0.10  33.3  4.65 0.63 1  6.5  35.6 
Tamil  
Nadu 
62.70  73.5  0.23  39.6  0.60 0.74 4.36 5.1  24.7 
UP  41.60  57.4  0.10  29.8  3.05 0.62 2.48 6.0  24.4 
West 
Bengal 
57.70  69.2  0.18  31.6  1.32 0.67 5.18 4.0  27.9 
Note: Share of manufacturing in state domestic product is used as a measure of capitalist elite while % of land held by top 5% of the population is a measure of 
capitalist elite. States with higher Gini in land distribution is also a measure of dominance of landed elite while the composite index of land reform legislation is a 
complement of dominance of landed elite. In particular, states with more land reform legislations are likely to have more harmonious class relationships. [1] 




Table 2. Presence of coalition government, degree of ethnic heterogeneity and  
voter turnout in the selected states, 1960-92 
 







SC/ST  Women   All  
AP 46.1  0.00  0.47  59.2  64.0  68.3 
Assam 38.85  0.00  0.64  57.5  56.0  61.3 
Bihar 58.9  0.25  0.70  41.7  42.5  53.5 
Gujarat 50.9  0.29  0.48  49.0  50.5 55.6 
Haryana 31.95 0.25  0.46  31.2  64.2  67.4 
J&K 31.7  0.00  0.26  31.7  51.2  69.0 
Karnataka 49.5  0.00  0.51  62.9  62.6  67.2 
Kerala 56.01  0.78  0.67  70.3  65.8  75.6 
MP 54.5  0.14 0.53  43.3  40.9  51.2 
Maharashtra 53.9  0.29  0.46  51.9  57.0  61.2 
Orissa 57.3 0.25  0.56  38.4  35.0  46.7 
Punjab 27.8 0.25  0.55  31.4  65.3 67.9 
Rajasthan 48.4  0.14  0.54  48.6 41.0  55.4 
Tamil Nadu  51.3  0.25  0.44  63.3  66.1  69.7 
UP 49.03  0.11  0.63  35.9  43.6  50.5 
West 
Bengal 
43.1 0.88  0.66  64.2  57.8  67.3 
Note:  All values are averages for the period 1960-92. While poverty rate is the state-level poverty head count ratios, ethnic 
heterogeneity is the composite index 1-∑pi
2 where pi is the share of the particular population group belonging to upper caste Hindus, 
SC, ST, Muslim, Christians, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Average values of coalition government are generated from the binary 
variable that takes a value 1 if the election resulted in a ruling government which is the coalition of more than one political parties.  
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables 
  
Variable Mean  Std.Dev. 
Educational expenditure as share of sdp 
(EDUEXPY) 0.0136  0.02 
Development expenditure as share of sdp 
(DEVEXPY) 0.0446  0.0845 
Non-development spending as share of sdp 
(NDEVEXPY)  0.0234 0.0422 
Changes in educational spending CHEDU  -0.00368  0.008 
Changes in development spending CHDEV  -0.0111  0.0473 
Changes in non-development spending 
CHNDEV -0.0072  0.0226 
Proportion of land held by the top 5% of the 
population (TOP5)  33.56851  5.524738 
Share of manufacturing in net state domestic 
product (MFG)  0.138163  0.0583 
Poverty HCR (HCR)  47.19207  12.55005 
Index of ethnic heterogeneity (ETHHETY)  0.543687  0.168208 
Proportion of all SC/ST members in the ruling 
party out of all seats won by the ruling 
government (PSCST)  0.25367  0.14652 
Proportion of all women in the ruling party out 
of seats won by the ruling government 
(PWOM) 0.04856  0.04509 
If coalition government in power  0.256198  0.438348 
If president’s rule  0.115702  0.321198 
Population density  268.9264  169.0429 
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST  0.212284  7.97E-02 
Proportion of women elected out of all women 




Table 4.  Correlation matrix 
 
      
   Landgini Top5  MFG  HCR 
Landgini 1     0.427**  0.233** 
Top5     1 0.16*    
MFG  0.427** 0.16*  1   
HCR  0.233**        1
 
Note: TOP5: land held by the top 5% of the population; MFG: Share of manufacturing in the state domestic product; HCR: poverty 
head count ratio. Any blank cell represents that the particular coefficient is insignificant and therefore is not shown. ‘*’ denotes that 
the coefficient is significant at least at 10% while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% level.  
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Table 5. Fixed effects estimates of changes in public spending on education 
  Uncorrected estimates    Corrected estimates   
  state fixed effects  state & time FEffects  state fixed effects  state & time fixed effects 
 1    2    3    4   
Variables  Coefficient   t-ratio   Coefficient   t-ratio   Coefficient  t-ratio   Coefficient   t-ratio  
Initial edn. 
spending 0.137076  1.65* 0.071 0.761 0.0541 0.485 0.000695 0.006
Land held by 
top 5% 
(TOP5) 0.000385  0.28 0.000768 0.724 0.00164 1.097 0.00132 1.001
Manufacturing 
share (MFG)  -0.20211 -1.89* -0.11174 -1.509 -0.000751 -1.26 -0.00044 -0.752
Poverty HCR     -0.000819  -1.943* -0.000465 -1.854* -0.36338 -2.518* -0.1904498 -1.779*
TOP5*HCR    -0.000003  -1.671* -0.0000034 -1.227 -0.000015 -1.814* -0.00000248 -1.142
MFG*HCR 0.00466  2.464** 0.00199 1.692* 0.00556 2.592** 0.00296 1.785*
SCST in govt.  0.00759  1.896* 0.000890 -0.267 0.0288 1.646* 0.0238 1.05
Women in 
govt. -0.0006  -0.275 0.00239 1.191 -0.0115 -1.11 -0.00471 -0.699
Ethnic 
heterogeneity   -0.0274  -4.891** -0.0251 -5.008** -0.0249 -4.448** -0.0257 -4.784**
resTOP5         0.000933 0.606  0.00044  0.37 
resMFG         0.124189 1.416  -0.0107  -0.147 
resSCST          0.0173 -0.965  -0.0242  -1.08 
resWOM         0.011 1.282  0.00226 0.515 
Residual for 
Top5*HCR[1]       Yes   Yes  
Residual for 
MFG*HCR[1]       Yes   Yes  
Intercept     0.00136 0.038    0.0137 -0.309 
R
2 0.69    0.84   0.74   0.84  
F-stat 5.97**    6.7**  5.92**   5.77**  
Nobs 113    113   113   113  
Note: The dependent variable in each case is the changes in the public spending on education (as a share of state domestic product) from the last election. 
Definitions of the variables are given in Table 4A.‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or lower level. [1] Both these 
residuals are insignificant too.  
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Table 6. Fixed effects estimates of changes in public development spending 
 
  Uncorrected estimates    Corrected estimates   
  state fixed effects 
state & time fixed 
effects   state fixed effects 
state & time fixed 
effects 
 1     2  3  4 
Variables   Coefficient   t-ratio   Coefficient  t-ratio   Coefficient  t-ratio   Coefficient  t-ratio  
Initial dev. 
Spending  0.6809 8.042** 0.8608 7.763** 0.7616 7.051** 0.8837324 6.843**
Land held by 
the top 5% 
(TOP5) 0.00434  -0.581 0.0028 -0.338 0.00054 0.061 0.0033 0.333
Manufacturing 
share (MFG)  -1.0348  -2.186* -1.0574 -1.951* -1.14195 -1.606 -1.21787 -1.532
Poverty HCR     -0.0085  -2.595* -0.007 -1.674* -0.0083 -2.382* -0.00528 -1.812*
TOP5*HCR 0.00009  1.901* 0.00012 1.67* 0.00006 1.662*  0.00006 1.642*
MFG*HCR 0.0228  2.565* 0.0167 1.687* 0.0283 2.552* 0.0240 1.919*
SCST in govt  0.0256  1.281 0.0127 0.497 -0.0384 -0.308 -0.0176 -0.109
Women in 
govt.   -0.0047  -0.393 -0.00063 -0.041 -0.00136 -0.035 0.00981 0.2
Ethnic hety  -0.1726  -5.705** -0.2123 -5.946** -0.163 -5.226** -0.2098 -5.468**
RESTOP5        -0.0127 -1.615  -0.0156 -1.271
RESMFG       -0.43917 -1.026  -0.7935 -1.533
RESSCST          0.0838 0.688  0.0237 0.149
RESWOM        0.0295 1.091  0.0031 0.092
Residual for 
Top5*HCR[1]       Yes   Yes  
Residual for 
MFG*HCR[1]       Yes   Yes  
Intercept     0.3361 1.216     0.1318 0.395
R
2 0.6    0.72   0.64   0.61  
F-stat 5.17**   3.53**   4.7**  3.42**  
Note: The dependent variable in each case is the changes in the public spending on development from the last election. ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower 





Table 7. Fixed effects estimates of changes in public non-development spending 
 
  Uncorrected estimates    Corrected estimates   
  state fixed effects 
state & time fixed 
effects   state fixed effects   state & time fixed effects 
  1     2 3 4 
Variables  Coefficient   t-ratio   Coefficient  t-ratio   Coefficient   t-ratio   Coefficient   t-ratio  
Initial non-dev 
Spending 0.4384  4.76** 0.5985 4.546** 0.457 3.808** 0.6087 3.998**
Land held by 
the top 5% 
(TOP5) 0.0003  0.083 0.00041 0.092 0.00296 0.627 0.0017 0.309
Manufacturing 
share (MFG)  -0.407  -1.613 -0.30323 -1.027 -0.6964 -1.82* -0.4965 -1.117
Poverty HCR     -0.0035  -1.981* -0.00277 -1.211 -0.0034 -1.805* -0.00268 -1.078
TOP5*HCR 0.000024  1.654* 0.000044 0.689 0.0000028 1.646* 0.000003 0.421
MFG*HCR 0.0106  2.223* 0.0054 1.994* 0.0156 2.597** 0.0095 1.661*
SC/ST in govt  0.0159  1.485 0.00809 0.577 0.0361 0.541 0.00145 0.016
Women in 
govt.  -0.00238 -0.371 0.0036 0.438 -0.0142 -0.684 0.00494 0.181
Ethnic hety   -0.0655  -4.109** 0.0844 -4.285** -0.0628 -3.754 -0.0869 -4.04**
RESTOP5        -0.00043 -0.103  -0.00148 -0.293
RESMFG        -0.1322 -0.57  -0.3289 -1.137
RESSCST          -0.009 -0.138  0.0058 0.066
RESWOM        0.0194 1.327  0.0057 0.308
Residual for 
Top5*HCR[1]       Yes  Yes  
Residual for 
MFG*HCR[1]       Yes  Yes  
Intercept     0.0740 0.487     0.0513 0.276
R
2  0.51    0.64  0.54  0.67  
F-stat  3.5**    3.27**  3.11**  3.22**  
Note: The dependent variable in each case is the changes in the public spending on non-development from the last election. ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or 




Table A1. FE Estimates of Changes in Education Spending: Alternative Specifications 
   1     2     3     4     5     6    
Variable   Coeff  t-ratio   Coeff  t-ratio   Coeff  t-ratio   Coeff  t-ratio   Coeff  t-ratio   Coeff  t-ratio 
                                      
Initial 
education 
spending  0.008 0.138  0.0006  0.009  0.04  0.540 0.101 1.383  0.02  0.365  0.14 1.872* 
Land held by 
the top 5% 
(TOP5)               -0.001  -2.03*   -0.002  -1.939*           
Manufacturing 
share (MFG)                              -0.124 -1.831* 
Poverty HCR                  -0.001 -2.132*  0.0007  2.456** -0.0007 -3.66** 
TOP5*HCR                    0.00003  1.607           
MFG*HCR                              0.003 2.579** 
SCST in govt.  0.0119 1.868* 0.011  1.708*  0.009 1.080 0.005 0.592  0.005 0.418  0.005  0.830 
Women in 
govt.        0.0008  0.405  -0.0007  -0.321  -0.0001 -0.057  0.002  1.166  -0.0002 -0.092 
Ethnic 
heterogeneity  -0.021  -4.23**  -0.02  -4.21** -0.03 -4.76**  -0.029 -5.36**  -0.02  4.760**  -0.03   5.915**   
R
2  0.54     0.54     0.59     0.65     0.61     0.68    
F-stat  5.63**     5.29**     4.90**     5.62**     5.97**     7.11**    
 
Note: ‘*’ denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes that at 1% or lower level. Also see note to Table 5. 
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(1) Education spending as share of state domestic product  Ozler, Dutt and Ravallion, 1996 
(2) Net state domestic product from manufacturing (as share of 
total net state domestic product) 
Besley and Burgess 
(3) Poverty head count ratio  Ozler, Dutta and Ravallion, 1996 
(4) Share of Hindu, SC, ST, Muslim, Christians, Jains, Buddhists,  
Sikhs in total population; we use this population proportion (si) to 
calculate ethnic heterogeneity as 1- ∑(si)
2 
Besley and Burgess, 2000 
(6) Land held by top 5%, top 10%, bottom 40% of the population  Besley and Burgess, 2000 
(7) Party of the chief Minister  Besley and Burgess, 2000 
(8) Winning SC/ST and woman candidate(s) in each state  Butler, Lahiri and Roy, 1996; Election Commission of India 
website 
(9) Combining (7) and (8), we obtain number of SC/ST and 
women representatives in ruling government 
 
 
 